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'In My Mind's Ear':  
Misconstruing Sounds as Sights –   
a Philosophical and Cinematical Caution  
 
 
HAMLET: 
My father! – methinks I see my father. 
 
HORATIO: 
Where, my lord? 
 
HAMLET: 
In my mind's eye, Horatio 
 
Shakespeare, HAMLET, Act 1, Scene 2 
 
 
Prologue 
 
As Hamlet reminded Horatio, to 'imagine' is to 'visualise' – to 'see' in 'my mind's eye' 
how an unseen object or event might have 'looked' were it to have fallen within the 
range of my vision. How odd, then, to speak of 'musical imagery', the subject of this 
conference, for 'the sounds of music' have no 'looks' to visualise, and a speaker of 
English has in common parlance no 'mind's ear' within which to – to what? – to 
entertain them?  
 
In the 18th-century, writers succeeded for a time in introducing readers to the phrase 'in 
my mind's ear'. Within a few years, however, the phrase vanished from learned 
discourse, never to return, and no one before or since, Shakespeare included, every 
coined a verb of common use to capture what I am doing with unheard sounds as I 
attend to them only 'in my mind's ear'.1 
 
                                                     
1 The unknown author of an entry on 'One's aural memory or imagination. What's the 
origin of the phrase 'In my mind's ear'?, as found on 24 March 2019 on the website 
https://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/minds-ear.html, affirms that "The first person known to 
have given the sense a name was the English poet Matthew Green, using the pseudonym Peter 
Drake, in The Grotto, 1733: 'The thinking Sculpture helps to raise Deep thoughts, the Genii of the 
place: To the minds ear, and inward sight, There silence speaks.' The expression became as 
commonly used as the earlier 'mind's eye'. For example, this extract from the diary of Fanny 
Burney, 1775: 'My mind's ear was once more pleased.' These days, the mind's ear is not often 
used [having] effectively dropped out of the language."  
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How puzzling! for we both hear and see events of the world about us, recalling and 
rethinking them, and the sounds that we hear and of which we think are no less useful 
to us than the sights that we see, recall and imagine. Many of you, indeed, like me, have 
centred much of our lives upon the musical sounds that we have heard and of which we 
have thought. Yet we, like our forebearers, have no way to refer distinctively to how we 
think of sounds rather than sights. Regardless of the incoherence, we speak instead of 
'imagining' them. 
 
 J. L. Austin once remarked that 
 
… our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found 
worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth marking, in the 
lifetime of many generations: these surely are likely to be more numerous, 
more sound since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the 
fittest, and more suitable, at least in all ordinary, and reasonably practical 
matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an 
afternoon – the most favoured alternative method.2 
  
Is our commonplace manner of misspeaking of sounds as if they were sights of no 
consequence? By the record and Austin's warning, one might think so. We know by the 
record as well, however, that many of the habits of western civilisation encompass 
biases that, however deeply embedded, ought long ago to have been uprooted.  
 
I do not intend in this talk to answer the question, but rather to encourage you to 
ponder the possibility that the bias of our western world toward speaking of events as if 
uniformly 'visual' may be an impediment toward sensing and working better with things 
'musical'. 
 
Let me begin, though, by drawing your attention to how pervasively the 'visual' bias has 
permeated philosophy, the discipline of our culture devoted to reflecting upon thinking 
itself, summarising how it shaped the conclusions of the most important work of its 
most justly celebrated performer, Immanuel Kant. 
 
 
A Presumption of Kant's 
 
In 1787 Kant issued the second (definitive) edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, his 
fascinating enquiry into how we are constrained when encountering things. Within it he 
                                                     
2 John L. Austin, "A Plea for Excuses", reprinted from the Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, 1956-57, as Chapter 6 of Austin's Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 
pages 123-52, at page 130. 
In My Mind's Ear: Misconstruing Sounds as Sights … a Caution Page 3 of 11 
gave an explanation, after Newton, of why our encounters are unexceptionally 
mathematical. Kant's account had three parts, the third interlinked with the others 
though often overlooked.  
 
 
Part I: Our Pure Awareness of Space 
 
To perceive anything as distinct from oneself is to encounter it as occupying a place 
within space, a subspace of it, and thereby to encounter space itself. Encountering 
space is therefore a necessary condition for perceiving anything as distinct from oneself. 
 
To occupy a place within space is to have the geometric form of that place. 
 
To perceive anything distinct from oneself is therefore to encounter it 
geometrically. 
 
One would be mistaken, however, to identify anything that one is perceiving with the 
place that it occupies, for were it to disappear from the place, one would continue to 
encounter the place within space, unoccupied by anything perceivable, as empty. 
 
Unlike our encounters with the things that we perceive within them, therefore, our 
encounters with the places within space, and thus space itself, must be unempirical, for 
we must already be aware of the presence of space, and its places, to perceive anything 
within them. Our encounter with space, and the places within it, must therefore be a 
priori (that is, uncontaminated empirically, or pure). 
 
 
Part II: the Non-objective Reality of the Self 
 
To recognise anything objectively, one must conceive of it while encountering it, thus 
thinking of it while doing so. The judgment 'I am thinking that … ' must therefore 
accompany my every act recognition. But to what could the 'I' within the judgment 
refer? 
 
Were I to be conceiving of anything by means of it, the 'I' would be a predicate 
capable of being applied to other things as well, contravening the uniqueness of 
the subject to which it refers;  
 
Were I on the other hand to be referring by it to something identifiable and 
distinct from others that I was encountering, I should have to be encountering it 
either purely (i.e., a priori) or empirically. 
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If purely (i.e., a priori), I should be encountering it formally, hence non-
objectively, contrary to the supposition that my encounter is 'objective'; 
 
If empirically, I should be encountering it contingently, contrary to the 
requirement that 'I am thinking that ...' must [necessarily] accompany my 
every act of recognition. 
 
However puzzling it may (and ought) to seem, therefore, the 'I' in 'I am thinking that …', 
as Pastor Schultz affirmed acutely soon after Kant's text appeared, can refer to   
 
 ... nothing more than bare consciousness which distinguishes no particular 
object but which must occupy all our presentations without distinction if they 
are to become thoughts or concepts. Therefore, since the I or self-consciousness 
must be presupposed in order to cognize an object at all, it is manifest from this 
that it cannot itself be cognized as [an] object but is a wholly simple 
presentation void of all content. Therefore, the absolute subject of our inner 
appearances is a something wholly unfamiliar to us of which we can know 
nothing.3 
 
 
Part III: the Spatial Presupposition of Temporal Identity 
 
To encounter anything distinct from ourselves, and thus spatially, is to perceive it by 
means of an 'outer sense' constrained formally, but only mediately, by time. To 
encounter anything at all, however, is to perceive it by means of an 'inner sense' 
constrained immediately by time alone. Our 'inner' encounters, therefore, are 
constrained only temporally, unlike our 'outer' encounters that are constrained both 
temporally and spatially;  
 
We can identify and therewith discriminate among our temporal 'inner' 
encounters, however, and thus determine (arithmetically) which come before, 
after and by how much, only by coordinating them with our encounters with 
objects moving within space and thus distinct from ourselves. 
 
To register the transcendental unity of apperception, therefore (the form of the 
consciousness of the 'I' in 'I am thinking that ...'), requires that we recognise objects 
moving in space and thus distinct from ourselves.  
 
                                                     
3 Schultz, Johann, Exposition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, translated with an 
Introduction (and with related reviews translated and appended) by James C. Morrison (Ottawa, 
Ontario: University of Ottawa Press, 1995 [1784]), pages 96 and 97. 
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The Lesson 
 
Kant's account remains profound and especially so now that we can dispose of long 
prevalent misrepresentations of Part I.4 To my knowledge, however, no serious reader 
of it has ever noted that the very surface of his story fails to cohere, for Kant disregards 
unwittingly how differently we hear things from how we see them as if the distinction 
were of no consequence. 
  
Kant's presumed unwittingly that 'to encounter', and thus 'to perceive', is 'to see' and 
hence, when imagining things, 'to visualise'. But that, strictly speaking, is nonsense! 
 
To hear the opening bars of Wagner's Tristan, for example, is to encounter 
something commonly perceivable and having a spatial presence, yet other than 
an object occupying a place within space that is geometrically constrained. 
 
The consequences of failing to account for the difference between hearing and seeing 
are broad and deep, philosophically and musically, for although we may assuredly 
extend the range of perceptual verbs to encompass uncommon events, as metaphorical 
expressions often do, we are in danger when doing so of contaminating unwittingly the 
new contexts with old connotations, preventing ourselves in the long run from 
distinguishing adequately among things as we work with them. 
  
When Wittgenstein admonished philosophers to avoid the game played properly by 
scientists of generalising (or theorising), striving instead to 'teach differences' by 
describing particulars more precisely, he was summing-up the lesson to be learned, and 
few examples are as philosophically enlightening as the common yet misbegotten 
presumption that the verb to imagine could be used safely as if synonymous, more or 
less, with to think of, regardless of how distinctly the things of which we think might, if 
and when encountered, be sensed. 
 
Let's return with caution, then, to the notion of 'musical imagery' – the supposed 
subject of this conference.  
                                                     
4 In 1902, for example, Henri Poincaré showed that any space specifiable within any of 
the alternative exhaustive geometries can be specified as accurately within any other, 
confirming that Kant's lack of awareness in the late 18th-century of non-Euclidean alternatives to 
the geometry that he presupposed is of only minor philosophical significance, though 
philosophers insufficiently acquainted with the history of mathematics continue to this day to 
misconstrue it as a fatal weakness of his account. See Chapter III ('Non-Euclidean Geometries') 
of Part II ('Space') of Poincaré's Science and Hypothesis (New York: Dover Publications: 1952), 
pages 35-50 [a reprint of the original 1905 translation into English by J. Larmor]).  
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'Imagining' Music? 
 
To suppose that we could ever without danger presume to 'imagine' music ought to give 
us pause, recalling again that the root connotations of to 'imagine' cluster about to 'see' 
in the 'mind's eye', that is, to 'visualise'.  
 
When hearing a musical event, we may well be provoked to imagine things, and seeing 
(or visualising) things may cause us to think of hearing musical events, as when 
accomplished musicians, by perusing a score, think of how they might hear were they to 
be listening to sounds compliant with it. Regardless of common practice, however, to 
speak as if we could somehow visualise how we are hearing when hearing musically 
portends confusion, for do so is to misconstrue audible things as if they were visible, 
courting the danger of failing to register workably how differently we hear from how we 
see.  
 
A composers, if doing so, would be in especial danger of constructing visual tools 
for performers (scores) whose structures, intended to guide the creation of 
audible events, that have unwittingly been constrained by forms and structures 
that are endemically visual (notations for sets, for example, or other 
'mathematical' templates).  
 
Mathematicians must struggle to train themselves to think independently of their visual 
notation (with only a very few, like Gödel or Robinson, succeeding in thinking 
mathematically of the notation itself). Small wonder that composers oft-misconstrue 
their task, for their visual tools remain unseen during subsequent hearings of the 
sounds, foreclosing ready comparison.5 
 
As we shall see, musically sensitive filmmakers, having to choose when making their 
movies what ought to be heard and seen by means of them, have often rebelled against 
using music. But first we must register how differently we hear from how we see, and 
what it means.  
 
 
Hearing versus Seeing 
 
In 1802 Thomas Young put forward what we now refer to as the tri-receptor theory of 
colour vision. The opening sentences of the pertinent paragraph are frequently 
                                                     
5 Close attention to the achievements of Schoenberg and Berg can blunt the temptation, 
for the initiators of serialism refused steadfastly to confuse their visual tools with the aural 
product: if the resulting sounds were awkward, incoherent or unenlightening, they were 
corrected regardless of the divergence from the structural imperatives of the tone rows.) 
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reproduced, accompanied often by the sentences of his lecture of 1845 refining the 
theory.6 
 
Now, as it is almost impossible to conceive each sensitive point of the retina to 
contain an infinite number of particles, each capable of vibrating in perfect 
unison with every possible undulation, it becomes necessary to suppose the 
number limited, for instance, to the three principal colours, red, yellow, and 
blue, of which the undulations are related in magnitude nearly as the numbers 
8, 7 and 6; and that each of the particles is capable of being put in motion less 
or more forcibly, by undulations differing less or more from a perfect unison; for 
instance, the undulations of green light being nearly in the ratio of 6½, will 
affect equally the particles in unison with yellow and blue, and produce the 
same effect as light composed of those two species: and each sensitive filament 
of the nerve may consist of three portions, one for each principal colour.7  
 
The succeeding sentences of the 1802 paragraph, however, added by Young as a 
contextual afterthought and hence easily overlooked by specialists concerned only with 
visual perception, are remarkable, for within them Young stated succinctly the 
fundamental fact distinguishing visual from auditory perception (and therewith our 
perception of colours from music), regardless of the wavelike commonality, 
mathematically speaking, of the stimuli that cause them. 
 
Allowing this statement, it appears that any attempt to produce a musical effect 
from colours, must be unsuccessful, or at least that nothing more than a very 
simple melody could be imitated by them; for the period [read: octave], which 
in fact constitutes the harmony of any concord, being a multiple of the periods 
of the single undulations, would in this case be wholly without the limits of 
sympathy of the retina, and would lose its effect; in the same manner as the 
harmony of a third or a fourth is destroyed, by depressing it to the lowest notes 
of the audible scale.8 
 
To hear, Young was implying, we must distinguish among overtones; to hear musically, 
regardless of our enculturated preferences for the diverse effects, we must register the 
complex relations holding between them, for, as Helmholtz was soon to confirm, they 
constitute the various timbres, relative consonances or dissonances, beats, etc., of the 
                                                     
6 Young corrected his account in 1845: the three principal sensations of colour are red, 
green, and violet rather than red, yellow and blue. 
7 From page 20 of "On the Theory of Light and Colours", Philosophical Transactions of 
the Royal Society of London (London: 1802) [as reproduced on page 112 of Readings in the 
History of Psychology, compiled and edited by Wayne Dennis (New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts, Incorporated, 1948)].  
8 Ibid. 
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music we hear. The electromagnetic spectrum from within which the stimuli for colour 
perception must be generated, however, is too short to encompass even an octave 
(much less multiples of it: overtones). We can therefore, as Young insisted, make only 
ad hoc correlations between how we hear musically and how we see things, for to see 
things we must discriminate how they are coloured. 
 
Two hundred years after Young, the work of Edwin Land and his associates confirmed 
unequivocally the distinction that he had drawn between hearing and seeing. To see 
anything, Land affirmed, is to distinguish its colour from that of other things registered 
within the visual field; and, as Young had conjectured, we have three kinds of receptors 
(cones) responsible primarily for registering the colours we see objects to have, each 
responsive to a range of contiguous frequencies of stimuli impinging upon them and 
together exhausting the frequency limits of the visible spectrum. 
 
The function of the three kinds of cones in seeing, however, differs markedly from that 
of our eardrums when hearing. Our eardrums vibrate as a whole in sympathy with the 
pulsating mass of air impinging upon them; our brains then measure how the ear is 
vibrating, thereafter breaking down the complex waveform into its constituent 
frequencies.  
 
As Land demonstrated, however (to the amazement of many accustomed to 
investigating how we perceive colour under artificial laboratory conditions), the ratio of 
the frequencies received by the cones from a point on an object in its natural 
surroundings fails to determine the colour we see it to have(!), for seeing, unlike 
hearing, requires us to register the presence of stable objects as being constantly 
coloured, even when the ratio of the frequencies coming from them, as is usually the 
case, vary widely over time. To accomplish this goal, the brain, following upon the firing 
of cones (achieved individually within 1012 seconds of being stimulated), registers 
independently the relative rate and extent of the firing of each of the three similar kinds 
of cones over the entire visual field(!) and only then, after comparing the three records, 
assigns the colour we see the points on the object to have.  
 
Roughly put, we see things when the brain itself, protruding through holes in the skull, 
registers visual stimuli without becoming like them in any way (e.g., we see a chair as 
brown without any part of our eyes becoming brown). Our ears, however, unlike our 
eyes, are sense organs, distinct from yet connected to the brain, that become like the 
world impinging rhythmically upon them: the brain registers how they have become, 
inferring how the world must then be to be like them. When hearing, therefore, unlike 
when seeing, we may distinguish how we hear from the objects causing it (e.g., we may 
attend to the sound of a trumpet without attending to any trumpet); to see a colour, 
however, is to see something coloured (i.e., to see how it is coloured). 
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Identifying the Self 
 
The above distinction has a notable consequence. Kant, after Leibniz and Hume, 
concluded that whatever the self may be, it is beyond encountering. He, after they, had 
looked for it and found only objects encounterable through the outer sense and thus 
distinct from the self, accompanied by fragmentary images encounterable through the 
inner sense unified formally in apperception (consciousness). Kant went looking for the 
self and missed it!  
 
Kant's account, however, like those of Leibniz and Hume before him, was visually 
biased. The objects that we encounter visually are, indeed, distinct from ourselves, for, 
when registering their presence, our eyes become in no way like them. When 
registering the vibrating mass of air impinging upon us, however, our ears vibrate as 
does the air!  
 
Precisely put, we become identical formally to the stimuli impinging upon us, 
and the identity persists throughout our encounter without interruption. 
 
However irreducibly fragmentary and distinct from ourselves the visual things 
that we encounter may be, our auditory encounters with sounds, contributing to 
our unified tactile experience of the world, are unified, unceasing and 
undifferentiated from it. 
 
To see things, as Kant noted, is to objectify them, locating them distinguishably from 
ourselves and each other within the space and time of the visual outer sense. What Kant 
failed to note, however, is that we can do so only by having identified the space and 
time of our visual encounters, populated with objects and events, with the unified time-
space that we have encountered already by means of our integrated tactile senses 
(kinaesthetic, aural, etc.) – senses that refuse to be distinguished as either inner or 
outer.  
 
Kant's account, as such, remains accurate, but only because he remained largely 
unconcerned with things encountered otherwise than as 'distinct from ourselves'. To be 
encountered as irreducibly 'distinct from oneself' is to be encountered visually.  
 
Kant went looking for the self and missed it. Had he 
instead listened for it, he might have realised that it had 
never been lost.  
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Conclusion 
 
How we hear differs from how we see. Yet the presumption that the things that we see 
must have priority over the things that we hear, both ontological and epistemological, is 
so embedded within our languages and expectations that to contest it seems as absurd 
as it seemed to many physicists early this century to contest the presumptions of our 
language about length, duration, simultaneity, uniqueness of spatial position and 
temporal direction, etc.. To presume that the world of things that we hear must be 
fitted within the world of things that we see, rather than the reverse, seems so natural 
that the corollary that access to it can be made without contamination by using tools of 
visualisation (verbs like to imagine, for example) seems equally so.  
 
Early this century, however, physicists began to realise that new tools had compelled 
them to encounter things of unprecedented oddity - so odd, in fact, that the language of 
physics would crumble under the shock; and, almost coincidently, filmmakers began to 
realise that their new tools were compelling them to construct worlds of sights and 
sounds for simultaneous and unprecedented encounter, thus compelling them to 
decide, for the first time in human history, which if either the worlds (sight or sound) 
took precedence over the other. The answer, unequivocal in practice, was that we 
measure the things that we see against the sounds that we hear. We encompass the 
worlds of things that we see within the unified tactile, kinaesthetic and auditory world 
that we inhabit and that constitutes our own identities.   
 
Within the metaphysical research laboratories of filmmaking, filmmakers attuned to the 
subtler aspects of things heard, among them Bergman, Bresson and Tarkovsky, have 
recurringly condemned the use of music to accompany the things seen by means of 
their films. Speech, an attribute of things seen, proved useful and often essential to 
them, even when narrated, as were sound effects. Background music, however, 
overwhelmed the visuals, rendering them somehow out of control. As Robert Bresson 
reminded himself late in life,9 
 
The eye (in general) superficial, the ear profound and inventive. A locomotive's 
whistle imprints on us a whole railroad station. … [page 39] 
 
When a sound can replace an image, cut the image or neutralize it. The ear goes 
more towards the within, the eye towards the outer. …[page 28] 
 
A flood of words does a film no harm. A matter of kind, not quantity. … [page 
14] 
                                                     
9 All quotations from Robert Bresson, Notes on Cinematography, as translated by 
Jonathan Griffith (New York: Urizen Books , 1975). 
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[But] Music takes up all the room and gives no increased value to the image to 
which it is added. … [page 21] 
 
Generality of music which does not correspond to a film's generality. Exaltation 
that hinders other exaltations. … [page 22] 
 
Music. It isolates your film from the life of your film (musical delectation). It is a 
powerful modifier and even destroyer of the real, like alcohol or dope. … [page 
86] 
 
No music as accompaniment, support or reinforcement. No music at all. [page 
10] 
 
Why? The things that we see by means of a film objectify (that is, are seen to be objects 
within) a space and time other than our own. Music, however, comes to us, tactilely and 
kinaesthetically, within our own time and space, and it is within that time and space that 
we place the distinct things that we see. When listening to music, we become as the 
music is, and hence, even sometimes against our will, we measure what we see against 
the feelings and thoughts provoked by the music. 
 
We are unified beings, constrained perceptually when encountering things as we are 
constrained when encountering things by means of the films that we make.  
 
Hearing differs from seeing, however, being both epistemologically and 
ontologically prior to it.  
 
Consequently, we must learn to think and to speak differently of aural versus visual 
things, distinguishing in word and deed, and in particular, how we think when 
'conceiving' of things heard from our 'imagining' of things seen; or we shall assuredly 
blunt whatever skills we acquire for constructing things of worth to be encountered by 
hearing or seeing or doing both at once – the making of music at its centre. 
 
 
